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On January 16, 2009, the Federal government approved Rhode Island’s application for a Global 
Consumer Choice Compact Medicaid Waiver whereby the state became the first granted 
permission to operate its entire Medicaid program under the state plan and a single 1115 
“research and demonstration” waiver. The Global Waiver has been implemented in the context 
of Republican proposals to turn Medicaid into a block grant which would give states 
substantially more flexibility administering the program in exchange for receiving an upfront 
allotment from the Federal government. Proponents have held up the Global Waiver as a 
successful example of what might be achieved nationally if all states received block grants to run 
their Medicaid programs. This study draws lessons from Rhode Island’s Global Waiver for the 
Medicaid block grant debate. Data derive from 325 archival sources and 26 semi-structured 
interviews. Results indicate that the Global Waiver is not a block grant but a capped federal 
match where the state is required to spend its own money before receiving the federal 
contribution. Moreover, the state did not receive unlimited discretion to administer Medicaid 
under the Global Waiver nor achieved nearly as much savings as has been claimed. Indeed, most 
savings obtained by Rhode Island during this time period derive not from efficiencies stemming 
from the Global Waiver but from increased federal spending and from measures the state could 
have implemented independently of the waiver. The generosity of the Global Waiver is in 
marked contrast to most block grant proposals which would substantially reduce the level of 
federal fiscal support. In the near future, turning Medicaid into a block grant is not going to 
occur in light of President Obama’s reelection. Identifying the implications of RI’s experience 
for Medicaid retrenchment and the block grant debate is important, however, as some states 
eschew expanding the program under the Affordable Care Act and as proponents continue to 
propose block grant approach to Medicaid reform, both in future budget proposals and 




Medicaid is the jointly funded federal-state health insurance program for the poor and 
disabled. Although administered by the states, the federal government matches state Medicaid 
spending at a rate determined by the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), which 
currently ranges from 50.0% to 73.4%, and is dependent on state per capita income (Snyder et al. 
2012). Medicaid provides coverage for more than 62 million low income individuals or 
approximately one in five Americans (Kaiser Family Foundation May 2012). As the largest 
federal grant-in-aid program, total expenditures reached $389 billion in 2010 (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS] 2011). Medicaid is also the largest fiscal item in state 
budgets, accounting for 21.8% of total spending (National Association of State Budget Officers 
2010). Annual growth in states’ Medicaid expenditures has exceeded growth in revenues, 
thereby causing Medicaid to consume increasingly larger proportions of state budgets. This has 
forced a tradeoff with other priorities since all states but Vermont must balance their budgets.  
Like other states, Rhode Island (RI) has faced considerable pressure to restrain Medicaid 
spending. In state fiscal year (FY) 2006, more than one-fifth of the state’s population obtained 
health insurance coverage from Medicaid (Executive Office of Health and Human Services 
[EOHHS] 2007). This included 15% of the state’s elderly residents and 40% of its school aged 
children. That year, the program constituted about $800 million or approximately one-quarter of 
the state’s budget (EOHHS 2007). Given that the state projected a structural deficit of more than 
$350 million over 5 years and that Medicaid spending growth far exceeded general revenue 
growth, Medicaid stood at the forefront of state budget discussions (EOHHS 2007). It is in this 
context that Republican Governor Donald Carceri submitted his administration’s Global 
Consumer Choice Compact Medicaid Waiver application to CMS, the federal agency responsible 
for administering Medicaid, on August 8, 2008.  
The state originally asked for the provision of a fixed, upfront federal allotment or block 
grant that would no longer require a state match. It instead proposed a state maintenance of effort 
provision where RI would continue to allocate 23% of its general revenue budget to the 
Medicaid program every year. CMS gave its official approval on January 16, 2009, the waiver’s 
official start date. Rhode Island became the first state granted permission from the federal 
government to operate virtually all of Medicaid under the state plan and a single 1115 “research 
and demonstration” waiver, with the exceptions being disproportionate share hospital payments 
and local education agency funding. Prior to the Global Waiver, Rhode Island’s Medicaid 
program operated under the state plan and multiple waiver authorities. 
The final version of the Global Waiver approved by CMS and implemented by the state 
beginning July 1, 2012 did not include the block grant structure. It instead set a cap whereby the 
state agreed to limit federal fiscal participation to a level no higher than the federal share of total 
state and federal spending of $12.075 billion over a five year demonstration period in exchange 
for the ability to make certain program changes. This five year budget was based on historical 
caseload and health utilization trends, accounting for a 7.8% rate of program growth. This kept 
Medicaid’s traditional funding structure intact, with the state having to spend a dollar first in 
order to receive the federal match. The Global Consumer Choice Compact Waiver has been 
implemented in the context of proposals to revamp Medicaid via the block grant strategy. 
The Medicaid Block Grant Debate 
Republican Congressman, House Budget Committee Chair and former Vice Presidential 
candidate Paul Ryan included provisions block granting Medicaid in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 
and 2013 House budget proposals (Ryan 2011, 2012). Both these proposals, which also would 
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have repealed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, passed the Republican 
controlled House of Representatives along a party line vote, a year after being proposed as part 
of a deficit reduction plan developed by Congressman Ryan with Alice Rivlin of the Brookings 
Institution (Rivlin and Ryan 2010). Former Massachusetts Governor and unsuccessful 
Republican Presidential candidate Mitt Romney drew from these proposals, with his economic 
plan claiming that “block grants have huge potential to generate both superior results and cost 
savings by establishing local control and promoting innovation” (Romney 2012). Romney even 
mentioned the potential of the block grant concept during the last Presidential debate, arguing 
that “states like Arizona, Rhode Island have taken these, these Medicaid dollars, [and] have 
shown they can run these programs more cost-effectively” (Millman 2012). Romney also 
famously promised to repeal “ObamaCare” on day one. These proposals to block grant Medicaid 
were made less than ten years after the George W. Bush Administration’s 2003 proposal to do so 
(Guyer 2003; Thompson 2012). Moreover, the Bush Administration’s proposal came less than 
ten years after the House Republican majority’s 1995 Medigrant proposal, which, in turn, came 
15 years after the block grant proposal put forth by the Reagan administration in 1981 (Lambrew 
2005; Holahan and Liska 1995; Thompson 2012). 
Although each block grant proposal would provide states a fixed allotment of federal 
funding in exchange for considerably greater flexibility over program eligibility, benefits, 
payments, and structure, the most recent proposals put forth by Congressmen and others are 
considerably less generous than those put forth previously. Federal allotments under the 1981 
Reagan administration proposal would have equaled federal spending at FY 1981 levels plus 9%, 
adjusted in subsequent years for the Gross National Product’s price deflator, an indicator of 
economic growth. Federal allotments under the 1995 House Republican proposal would have 
been determined by a complicated formula based on historical spending adjusted annually for 
state input costs, case mix, and number of poor people, subject to an overall, aggregate cap on 
federal Medicaid expenditures (Lambrew 2005). Under the 2003 Bush Administration proposal, 
spending levels in FY 2002 would have been used as the base from which federal allotments 
would be determined. These would have then been increased by 8.5% per year, the average 
Medicaid growth rate at the time. The Romney plan, by contrast, suggested that “Medicaid 
spending should be capped and increased each year by CPI [Consumer Price Index] +1%” 
(Romney 2012). Increases under the 2012 and 2013 House budget plans would have been limited 
to the CPI only while those under the 2010 Ryan-Rivlin plan to the GDP per capita plus +1%. 
An even less generous proposal put forward by the House Republican Study Committee would 
have fixed funding at 2012 spending levels with no subsequent adjustments for inflation or 
increases in health care costs (House Republican Study Committee 2012).  
There are several reasons proponents cite to support delegating further responsibilities to 
the states by block granting the Medicaid program (Davidson 1997; Labrew 2005; Anonymous 
2003; Holahan and Weil 2003; Leichter 2008; Miller 2002; Rivlin and Ryan 2010; Ryan 2011, 
2012). Most obviously, it would provide the federal government with fiscal certainty regarding 
the amount that would need to be paid out in any given year. Additionally, it theoretically offers 
those government officials “closest to the people” greater freedom to appropriate funds where 
they might have the most beneficial impact. This is both because doing takes advantage of 
experience state and local officials have in managing day-to-day program operations, and 
because state and locally run programs tend to be less rigid and bureaucratic than their nationally 
administered counterparts. It is also because state and locally administered programs best 
account for local norms, circumstances, values, and standards, say, with regard to the amount of 
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funding allocated and service delivery options made available. Proponents further believe that 
the additional flexibility provided by a block grant would enable states to reshape Medicaid to 
promote greater personal responsibility, thereby mirroring trends visible in the private health 
insurance market. For example, greater cost sharing could be imposed, and benefit packages 
made to more closely resemble private insurance benefits to better preclude crowd-out of the 
private market. Moreover, block grant enthusiasts express confidence in the capacities of state 
and local officials to experiment, innovate, and ultimately develop policy approaches that best 
meet people’s needs and preferences when freed from constraints otherwise placed on them by 
the federal government. 
There are several reasons opponents cite to oppose delegating greater state control of 
health policy under the block grant strategy (Davidson 1997; Anonymous 2003; Holahan and 
Weil 2003; Lambrew 2005; Miller 2002; Park 2011; Holahan, et al. October 2012). Those 
opposing block granting Medicaid fear marked reductions in federal fiscal support for the 
vulnerable populations Medicaid serves. It is feared that growth in state allotments would fail to 
keep pace with increases in health and medical costs over time. It is also feared that state 
allotments would fail to keep pace with growth in Medicaid enrollment, particularly during 
economic downturns. The result would be a gradual shifting of costs from the federal to state and 
local governments, providers, and programs beneficiaries over time. Opponents of block grants 
also fear a race-to-the bottom if national standards are loosened and a growing proportion of the 
financial burden falls to the states. States already exhibit considerable discretion when 
administering Medicaid, resulting in substantial cross-state variation in program spending, 
eligibility, benefits, provider payments, and service delivery system characteristics nationally 
(Miller 2002; Snyder, et al. 2012). This variation would increase dramatically as state political, 
economic, programmatic, and cultural characteristics became even more determinative of state 
policy making in this area. Fundamentally, opponents believe that it is the responsibility of the 
federal government to reduce interstate variation, or to bring it within a reasonable or acceptable 
range, so that the locus of one’s birth or residency does not influence one’s ability to receive 
health and medical care as a result of states’ varying commitments and willingness to act.  
In a January 2011 report, former EOHHS Secretary Gary Alexander claimed that RI’s 
Global Consumer Choice Compact Waiver represented a model for entitlement reform 
throughout the nation (Alexander 2011). He claimed that in exchange for the aggregate cap 
agreed upon with the federal government, the state received “unprecedented flexibility and some 
relief from onerous federal rules” to “tailor its program to meet the needs of its population.” He 
also claimed that the waiver enabled the state to achieve $100 million in savings during the first 
18 months, a figured he projected to reach $146 million over two years. Despite doubt’s in RI 
about the veracity of Alexander’s conclusions (Hall 2011; Levy 2011; Pugh 2011), conservatives 
have held up the Global Waiver as a successful example of what might be achieved nationally if 
all states received block grants to run their Medicaid programs (Anonymous 2011; Roberts 2011; 
Pugh 2011; Lawless and Ferrier 2011; Senate Finance Committee 2011; Volsky 2011; Romney 
2012; Ryan 2011, 2012). 
Because RI is the first state to receive permission to operate its entire Medicaid program 
under a global cap it has entered the national consciousness as a key data point potentially 
supporting the block grant approach to Medicaid reform. Block grant advocates’ hope that this 
basic concept will spread from RI to other states. This study draws lessons from the design and 
implementation of RI’s Global Consumer Choice Compact Medicaid Waiver for federal block 
grant initiatives and other proposals that seek to retrench the program. 
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Methods 
This study relies on two primary sources of data: archival documents and in-depth open-
ended interviews with key stakeholders. The interviews were undertaken with people chosen 
through a combination of purposive and snowball sampling (Patton 2002). Thus, selection of 
subjects was initially based on our own knowledge about RI and the Medicaid program but later 
on information provided by our respondents regarding additional actors who should be 
interviewed about the design and implementation of the Global Waiver. Twenty-six semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 30 individuals from March 17, 2010 through May 28, 
2010. Two interviews included two subjects each (two consumer advocates; two executive 
branch officials); one interview included three subjects (three state officials). Interviews were 
about one hour long. Interview subjects included: legislative staff (2 individuals); current and 
former officials within the pertinent executive/administrative agencies (7 individuals); consumer 
advocates representing different populations (e.g., the elderly, developmentally disabled, 
mentally ill, physically disabled, children and families) (10 individuals); provider representatives 
representing different service modalities (e.g., nursing homes, home care, managed care, shared 
living, community providers) (8 individuals); and other knowledgeable observers (3 individuals) 
(i.e., consultant, other executive branch officials).  
Stakeholders representing different backgrounds were recruited as interview subjects to 
ensure representation of varying points of view about Medicaid and the Global Waiver (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967). Use of a diverse sample is important because the greater the degree to which 
the perceptions of people about a particular phenomenon converge, the more likely that they 
provide a reasonably accurate portrayal of the process studied (Jick 1979). Use of a diverse 
sample also is important because employing multiple types of informants minimizes the threat of 
single-source information bias while maximizing the breadth of the information consulted 
(Pothas and de Wet 2000).  
Through our interviews we sought to identify what factors contributed to the design of 
the Global Waiver. This includes the purpose of the waiver and the reactions of government 
officials and other interested actors. We also sought to understand factors influencing subsequent 
approval and oversight of the Global Waiver by the federal government. This includes 
negotiations between state and federal officials that resulted in changes to the state’s waiver 
application. We further sought to understand factors facilitating and/or impeding implementation 
of the Global Waiver. This includes the role of the economic recession, state budget crisis, and 
federal stimulus package, and other factors in this regard. All interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. Each transcript was coded to identify recurring themes and patterns in responses 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). This was an emergent process to the extent that we formulated new 
categories and revised old ones as we read the transcripts. Once a full set of codes were 
developed, we went back and recoded all transcripts using the common set of themes developed. 
Quotes illustrative of each theme identified for each major programmatic phase—waiver 
development, federal approval, and program implementation—were excerpted (See Table).  
[Table about Here] 
In addition to analyzing interview transcripts, more than 325 archival sources published 
between 2007 and 2012 were reviewed. Pertinent statutes and regulations about Medicaid and 
the Global Waiver were identified and collected; so too were relevant government reports, press 
releases, letters, and other documents. Information was collected from consumer advocacy 
groups, provider organizations, and other non-governmental entities, in addition to articles 
published in the Providence Journal and other news sources. This information was used to cross-
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validate the descriptions and perspectives of key informants (Jick 1979), corroborating accounts 
given by interviewees through independent verification in alternative sources. They also 
provided historical background on Rhode Island’s Medicaid program and the Global Waiver.  
Findings 
Phase 1. Waiver Development 
The Global Waiver derived largely from political and ideological alignment between RI’s 
Republican Governor and the George W. Bush administration which had long advocated block 
granting the program. The lack of specifics provided during the waiver development process 
exacerbated stakeholder concerns about the block grant strategy pursued.  
1.a. The Global Waiver Was Politically and Ideologically Motivated 
In light of perceived challenges, RI would have been unlikely to propose its plan for 
Medicaid restructuring in the absence of federal encouragement. On January 31, 2003, the Bush 
administration unveiled a proposal through which states could volunteer to block grant Medicaid 
(Lambrew 2005; Holahan and Weil May 27, 2003; Guyer May 2003; Thompson 2012). Under 
this proposal, states that chose to participate would no longer have to apply for waivers to 
modify federal standards for Medicaid design. While participating states would still be required 
to provide comprehensive benefits for low-income beneficiaries whose coverage is federally 
mandated, they would have significantly more flexibility to change service delivery, eligibility, 
and benefits for optional beneficiaries without going through the labor-intensive waiver process 
each time. Instead of receiving matching funds based on actual needs and costs, state would have 
received a fixed amount of money per year from the Federal government, with responsibility for 
expenditures beyond this cap falling solely on the states. Under this proposal, as noted, spending 
levels in FY 2002 would have been used as the base from which federal allotments would be 
determined. These would have then been increased by 8.5% per year, the average Medicaid 
growth rate at the time. As an incentive for states to participate, federal contributions would have 
increased by an additional 2% in 2004 to fund new programs and an additional 1% between 2004 
and 2010 but subsequently reduced for three years so that the total amount would have been 
budget neutral over ten years. States, however, would have been obligated to show maintenance 
of effort, requiring them to devote, at a minimum, an amount equal to their FY 2002 spending, 
increased each year by the medical inflation portion of the CPI.  
Not able to convince Congress to give them the authority to block grant the program, 
however, the Bush administration sought to demonstrate the effectiveness of the general 
approach by recruiting states willing to place an overall cap on federal contributions. This is 
consistent with Thompson and Burke’s (2007) observation that “CMS acted more as a teacher of 
the states than as a student of them. The Bush administration held strong views on how to 
improve Medicaid…The administration invited states to submit waivers targeted toward these 
ends less because it thought it could learn from the demonstrations than because it wanted states 
to adopt its approach. ‘Try it, you’ll like it’ might as well have been the motto.” The only states 
that considered the administration’s proposal were states with Republican governors (e.g., 
Connecticut, California, Colorado, New Hampshire, and Florida) (Anonymous 2003; Gold 
2004). Ultimately, the governors in these states either chose not to pursue this policy, or were 
blocked in doing so by Democratic controlled state legislatures.  
Rhode Island proved to be the only volunteer, though Vermont had previously received 
two such 1115 waivers with separate caps for acute and long-term care. Because of its small size 
state officials believed that RI was in an excellent position to test Medicaid reform models which 
could then be transferred to other states (EOHHS 2008). Like other states, however, the political 
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alignment of the state’s Republican governor and Bush administration proved to be the key 
reason why the state first considered and then opted to pursue the Global Waiver. Indeed, 
respondents felt that the waiver was ideologically motivated, spurred on by federal and state 
Republican administrations focused more on restraining spending and delegating further 
responsibilities to the states than on improving beneficiary access and quality.  
1.b. Block Grant Structure of Proposed Waiver Heightened Stakeholder Concern 
The absence of specifics provided during the waiver development process, combined 
with the proposed block grant structure of the Global Waiver, contributed to considerable distrust 
and concern on the part of outside groups (Alker 2008; Byrant 2008; Davis 2008; Katz 2008 
Peoples July 30, 2008; Reed and Whitehouse 2008; Solomon 2008). It was clear was that the 
state could acquire additional flexibility to shape Medicaid, possibly under more limited state 
and federal funding authority than existed before. It was unclear what the state would use that 
additional flexibility for. In the midst of the worst state budget crisis since the Great Depression, 
providers, consumers, and their representatives assumed the Global Waiver would be used by the 
Governor to cut back on the state’s commitment to the program and the vulnerable populations it 
serves, particularly since official pronouncements emphasized protecting mandatory populations 
and services but not optional benefits and eligibility groups to which most program funding has 
traditionally been devoted (Alker 2008; Beckwith 2008; Bryant 2008; Davis 2008; The Poverty 
Institute August 15, 2008).  
Key stakeholders were especially fearful that the state might have underestimated the 
amount of funding needed and, as such, run out of federal block grant money during the second 
or third year of the five year waiver period, particularly given the state of the economy and likely 
increase in Medicaid rolls (Alker 2008; Katz 2008; Lillis 2008; Peoples July 21, 2008; Reichard 
2008). The absence of additional federal funding would, in turn, leave state officials with no 
choice but to fund the program entirely with state dollars or, more likely, to severely ratchet back 
its commitment to the populations served. This concern stemmed largely from doubts about the 
baseline figures and trend rates chosen to estimate the federal and state allocations requested.  
Phase 2. Federal Approval 
Major changes to the state’s Global Waiver application were negotiated during the course 
of the federal approval process. These included the imposition of a dramatically different 
financial arrangement than the state initially requested—a capped federal-match rather than 
block grant structure. It also included the provision of an escape clause, permission to draw in 
federal matching dollars for previously state-only expenditures, and imposition of the waiver’s 
“Special Terms and Conditions” and three-tier system of federal oversight. 
2.a. Changes to the State’s Waiver Application: A Capped Federal Match 
In short, the state agreed to a cap on combined federal and state spending of $12.075 
billion over five years (Office of the Governor 2008). It was estimated that the state would save 
$358 million during this time period. Several reasons were identified for why the state’s block 
grant request was not approved. First, there may have been doubt about whether CMS had the 
authority to waive the federal matching structure. Many argued that statutory changes to the 
Medicaid program statute would need to take place first before the agency could grant requests 
such as this (Alker 2008; The Poverty Institute 2008; Dingell, et al. 2008; Katz 2008). At a 
minimum, there would have been legal challenges delaying approval of the waiver until the onset 
of the Obama administration which would not have been as positively disposed toward the 
state’s intentions. Second, CMS would not permit the state to acquire the rights to the federal 
portion of any savings that might accumulate during the course of the waiver. Essentially, CMS 
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did not want the federal government to spend more under the waiver than it would have spent 
without the waiver, at least as reflected in the spending targets agreed upon based on 
assumptions about caseload and cost increases applied to five years of baseline funding history. 
Indeed, CMS ultimately set yearly spending targets to better ensure that the state remained 
within the funding cap negotiated.  
2.b. Stakeholder Concerns about the Capped Federal Match 
In general, outside stakeholders felt better about the capped federal match than about the 
proposed block grant because the state could only receive federal funding if it spent money itself, 
thereby better assuring state officials’ commitment to the program while limiting the extent to 
which it could be reorganized. But while state officials felt comfortable with the $12.075 billion 
total funding ceiling negotiated—CMS basically accepted what state staff believed to be fairly 
inflated estimates (Anonymous 2009; Alexander 2011), outside stakeholders still doubted the 
adequacy of the state’s projections, believing that the total cap on expenditures might not be 
sufficient to fund the program with adverse but as yet unknown implications for program 
beneficiaries (Anonymous 2009; Coffey 2009; National Association of Social Workers 2009; 
Needham 2009; Needham and Gregg 2008, 2009; Peoples December 20, 2008; Solomon 2009). 
They were especially concerned about the lack of details regarding the state’s intentions. State 
officials pointed to the waiver as a general framework within which specific decisions would be 
made in time. Thus, Ann Martino, Policy Administrator at the Department of Human Services, 
argued that “[the waiver] really is a blueprint for moving forward. I think that’s one of the 
confusions when people say there is no detail. Essentially, what the federal government did is 
provide us with authority to do certain things. How we use that authority is part of the 
implementation process and will be directed in part by the General Assembly and also input from 
the community” (Needham 2009). 
There was particular concern about the state accepting a cap on federal funding without 
knowing what the future might hold. Given perceived limitations associated with the funding 
cap, there was also concern that state officials would use whatever additional flexibility that had 
been provided to draw back on its commitment to the program in order to help reduce the state’s 
budget deficit. This outcome had already been seen in Vermont, where funds from their Choices 
for Care long-term care waiver were diverted by the state legislature to close a budget gap, even 
while waitlists for home- and community-based services persisted. That RI’s $12.075 billion 
funding ceiling was decided on before the economic downturn reached its nadir was especially 
worrisome for some because it did not fully account for higher than expected unemployment and 
accompanying increases in Medicaid enrollment (Solomon 2009; Anonymous 2009; Goodnough 
2009). The waiver was based on an assumption of a maximum unemployment rate of 4.9%, but 
during the recent economic downturn RI’s unemployment topped 10% (Reed, et al. 2009).  
In addition, the $12.075 billion cap agreed upon was substantially less than what the state 
had requested. In its August 2008 waiver application, the state had asked for $12.386 billion in 
total program funding over five-years. This was subsequently revised up to $12.9 billion in 
October 2008 during the state’s negotiations with CMS (Solomon 2009). The final cap agreed 
upon was based on historical spending, adjusted with an annual growth rate of 7.8%, which is 
lower than Vermont’s rate of 9.0%, RI’s original August 2008 projection of 9.2%, and its revised 
October 2008 projection of 10.2% (Solomon 2009). The 7.8% rate includes a 1.2% anticipated 
enrollment increase, in contrast to RI’s August and October 2008 estimates of 2.3% and 3.3%, 
respectively. [It was assumed that per member per month annual costs would increase by 6.8%.] 
This discrepancy between what the state requested and what was ultimately agreed upon raised 
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concerns that the total funding level might not be adequate to meet applicants’ needs. The 
uncertain implications of federal fiscal support, an increasing likelihood given the outcome of the 
November 2008 election and the rapidly deteriorating state of the economy, raised concern a 
well (Solomon 2009; Needham and Gregg 2009; National Association of Social Workers 2009). 
Indeed, the federal stimulus package that would soon pass would temporarily increase the state’s 
FMAP from 52% to 64% and require the state to maintain eligibility at July 1, 2008 levels or else 
risk losing whatever additional federal money might be provided. The latter provision also meant 
that state officials would have little control over whatever enrollment increases might occur as a 
result of the recession. 
2.c. Stakeholder Concerns about the Inclusion of an Escape Clause 
State officials highlighted negotiation of a clause permitting the state to opt out of the 
waiver should the funding situation become untenable due to unforeseen and emergent 
conditions (Carcieri 2009; Anonymous 2009; Peoples February 4, 2009). Should that happen, 
however, outside stakeholders were concerned that the program would revert back to the state 
plan only. If this happened the state would lose initiatives originally authorized under the state’s 
eleven prior waivers but folded into the Global Waiver. This includes the states highly successful 
RIte Care waiver enrolling children and families in managed care and various home- and 
community-based services programs serving the elderly, severely mentally ill, developmentally 
disabled, and other populations (Reed, et al. 2009). 
2.d. Changes to the State’s Waiver Application: Special Terms & Three-Tier Oversight 
In exchange for the total cap on program expenditures negotiated, the state wished to 
obtain as much flexibility as it could to make changes (Alexander 2011). Ultimately, state 
officials negotiated the waiver’s “Special Terms and Conditions” (STCs) which required state 
officials to be somewhat explicit about the actual changes they intended to make (Weens 2009). 
Essentially, the state was granted the flexibility to make the changes documented in the STCs 
without having to request permission for making those changes from the federal government 
(Weens 2009). If, however, the state wished to make changes that were not so specified, then the 
degree of federal oversight would depend on the three category system of federal oversight 
adopted. These categories, termed I, II, and III and defined by CMS when it authorized the 
waiver, were designed for purposes of establishing federal oversight protocols and to make 
federal review more commensurate with the scope of program changes proposed.  
Category I changes include those that are administrative in nature which the state has 
authority to change under the State plan or waiver’s STCs; these may not affect beneficiary 
eligibility, benefits, overall healthcare delivery systems, payment methodologies, or cost sharing. 
Although the state must notify CMS of a proposed change, federal approval is not required for 
implementation. Category II changes include those that could be made as a State Plan 
amendment or through a 1915 waiver authority without changing the waiver’s STCs. They may 
not affect eligibility but can extend to other program dimensions. Although CMS approval is not 
required prior to implementation, federal matching funds will not be provided for changes that 
are implemented but not approved; states must also comply with State Plan public notice 
requirements and inform CMS in writing prior to implementation, including pertinent 
justification and assurances. Category III changes include those that require modifications to the 
current waiver or expenditure authorities or STCs and any change not clearly identified as I or II. 
CMS approval is required prior to implementation; states must also comply with State Plan 
public notice processes and notify CMS in writing and submit a demonstration amendment to the 
Global Waiver. Negotiations between federal and state officials focused on picking and choosing 
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what types of changes went into each of the three categories identified and how long CMS had to 
review changes associated with each. Most felt that the state has likely faced far more scrutiny 
under the Obama administration than it would have had under a Republican administration.  
2.e. Changes to the State’s Waiver Application: Cost Not Otherwise Matchable 
CMS granted RI the authority to obtain up to $22 million in federal matching funds 
annually for populations and services previously covered only by the state. These are known as 
CNOMs or Costs Not Otherwise Matchable. The purpose in granting the state this authority was 
determine if such a strategy was cost-effective over the long run by slowing down or preventing 
the trajectory towards full Medicaid eligibility, say, through the provision of adult day care 
services that preclude future nursing home placement. CMS agreed to permit the state to CNOM 
certain state-only programs, although limited to people with incomes up to 200% of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) at the insistence of the Federal Office of Management and Budget. State 
officials believed that CMS was amenable to the state’s CNOM request because they 
persuasively argued about the potential benefits of doing so for the bottom line.  
Phase 3. Waiver Implementation 
Federal stimulus money helped the state support caseload increases resulting from rising 
unemployment levels while softening the state’s emphasis on reducing spending. That the state 
had to maintain eligibility levels to qualify for federal stimulus support has also helped to 
ameliorate stakeholder concerns. So too has been recognition that the state would not lose its 
federal match as a result of exceeding the federal funding cap. The latter was both because of the 
generosity of the funding cap itself and because state spending was not high enough in the 
current fiscal climate to draw in enough federal matching dollars to exceed it. The provision of 
federal CNOM money helped to support the program as well.  
3.a. Federal Stimulus and Health Reform Legislation Facilitated Implementation 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided states with 
significantly enhanced federal fiscal support which, in the case of RI, reduced the state’s 
contributions from 47.43% to 36.11% of Medicaid program costs from October 1, 2008 through 
December 31, 2010, subsequently extended through June 30, 2011 though at somewhat lower 
levels. This, in turn, increased federal contributions by a total of $523 million during this time 
period (Cross-Call 2012). In short, the ARRA helped reduce advocates fears about the Global 
Waiver (Prah 2010). They particularly appreciated the stimulus’ eligibility provisions; in order to 
be eligible for additional federal matching dollars states could not adopt more stringent eligibility 
requirements than those existing as of July 1, 2008, a provision since extended with the 
Affordable Care Act. Indeed, the number of Medicaid eligibles increased considerably during the 
course of Global Waiver implementation, from 181,288 in July 2009 to 196,985 in December 
2011, due largely to growth in the state’ unemployment rate (DHS 2010-2012). Ultimately, 
additional federal financing provided under the ARRA helped to support caseload increases 
resulting from the recession while, perhaps, ameliorating the state’s emphasis on restraining 
program spending and giving it time to prepare administratively for changes planned under the 
Global Waiver. It has been estimated that the ARRA saved the state $148 million and $207 
million, respectively, in state FY 2009 and FY 2010 (EOHHS 2011).  
3.b. Cap on Federal Expenditures Has Not Been an Issue 
Rhode Island was not in danger of losing its federal Medicaid match despite initial fears 
that it might exceed the targeted amount agreed upon with the federal government. At $1.76 
billion during the waiver’s first demonstration year (calendar year 2009), for example, the state 
had spent $838 million less than its $2.6 billion expenditure target (DHS 2010-2012). The same 
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is true of the waiver’s second and third demonstration years (calendar years 2010 and 2011) 
where, in fact, the difference between actual and projected spending grew. At $1.9 billion in 
2010, the state spent $1.3 billion less than its $2.4 billion expenditure target. At $1.9 billion in 
2011, the state spent $1.8 billion less than its $2.3 billion target. Especially in the current fiscal 
climate the limiting factor has been the level of state appropriations and spending; there is just no 
way the state can come up with enough of its own funding to exceed the federal cap. This 
cushion also derived from overly generous assumptions regarding the rate of program growth. 
The state’s expenditure target was based on a five-year average, trended forward on the basis of 
expected enrollment and utilization increases. One reason that actual spending levels have been 
so much lower than projected levels is that the trend factor used did not take into account the 
actual levels of spending the state would experience due to the prevailing fiscal crisis. Another 
reason is that the state purposefully built a cushion into its projections. Both provider 
representatives and consumer advocates recognized that fear about the spending cap had been 
somewhat over blown (Pugh 2011; Cross-Call and Solomon 2011).  
3.c. CNOM Dollars Helped Ameliorate Impact of Fiscal Crisis & Spending Cap 
The state has been successful in using its CNOM authority to obtain additional federal 
dollars for services and populations that do not typically qualify for the federal Medicaid 
match—that is, programs previously funded entirely through general revenue funds, including 
for people who do not meet state Medicaid eligibility criteria and services for people who are 
eligible for Medicaid but do not typically receive a particular type of coverage. The state’s 
CNOM authority appears to be one of most popular aspects of the Global Waiver (Freyer 2011). 
This is because the ability to CNOM state programs has saved the state money, in some cases 
supporting expansions, in others helping to prevent service cuts. Indeed, there is general 
agreement that CNOMs, which have provided the state with much needed fiscal relief, have been 
used to maintain service levels and benefits that otherwise would have been reduced or 
eliminated due to prevailing budgetary difficulties.  
Lessons for Block Granting Medicaid and Other Retrenchment 
Rhode Island’s experience with the Global Waiver provides lessons, both for the federal 
block grant debate and Medicaid retrenchment more generally. Findings indicate that the Global 
Waiver is neither a block grant nor a model for one and that block granting the program would 
do irreparable harm, resulting in marked reductions in state spending, beneficiary enrollment, 
and provider payments. Despite potentially negative effects, it is likely that proposals to block 
grant and retrench Medicaid will continue to be made as state and federal health reform 
continues to be debated in today’s hyper-partisan political environment. 
The Global Waiver: Not a Block Grant nor a Model for One 
Simply put, RI’s Global Waiver is not a model that supports extension of the block grant 
concept to Medicaid reform nationally. As noted previously, the Global Waiver is not a block 
grant but a caped federal match whereby the state is still required to expend its own resources 
before receiving contributions from the Federal government. Furthermore, the state did not 
receive significantly more discretion to administer Medicaid but instead acquired permission to 
make certain program changes under the waiver’s Special Terms and Conditions, with additional 
changes being subject to the three-tier system of federal oversight adopted. Moreover, most of 
the savings achieved by RI during this time period derive not from the Global Waiver but from 
other sources, including increased spending on the part of the Federal government. Indeed, 
analysts at the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities conclude that one reason RI spent less 
under the Global Waiver was the provision of millions of dollars in federal stimulus support and 
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the institution of cost-savings measures that could have been implemented independently, either 
of a federal waiver or the global cap (Cross-Call and Solomon 2011). They also conclude that the 
Federal government actually spent more money under the Global Waiver than it would have 
otherwise spent, not only because of the federal stimulus package and CNOM authority but 
because the global cap was set well above what the state expected to spend. That the state has 
spent substantially less than it could have spent under the waiver agreement—for example, $1.76 
versus $2.6 billion in year 1—reflects the overgenerous ceiling put into place, not “savings” or 
“surpluses” claimed by block grant advocates. 
Overall, just $22,944,888 in state savings deriving from the Global Waiver provisions 
approved by CMS have been identified during the first three fiscal years of implementation 
(2009-2011), all of which could have been implemented under other authorities without a global 
federal cap and a far cry from the $100 million purportedly saved during the first 18 months (The 
Lewin Group 2011). Combined with $42,771,921 in additional federal matching dollars brought 
in under the waiver’s CNOM authority, the state reduced its total spending by $65,716,217 as a 
result of the Global Waiver. Other initiatives implemented during this time also saved the state 
money but cannot be attributed to the state’s Global Waiver agreement with the federal 
government and certainly do not depend on a global cap. These can be divided among savings 
deriving from initiatives requiring additional CMS approval—$9,396,325—and program 
management initiatives requiring state agency and/or legislation action—$22,892,894 
Block Grant Proposals Would Sharply Reduce Spending  
The generosity of the waiver agreement received by RI is in marked contrast to extant 
block grant proposals which would substantially reduce federal fiscal support provided to states 
under Medicaid. In 2011, the Congressional Budget Office (2011) estimated that federal 
Medicaid spending under Ryan’s FY 2012 House budget proposal would fall 35% short of 
current projections for 2022 and 49% short of current projections for 2030 due to the block grant 
provisions. A year later the Congressional Budget Office (March 2012) reported that under 
Ryan’s FY 2013 proposal, federal Medicaid, CHIP, and health subsidy spending would fall 
58.3%, 61.5%, and 75% short of current projections in 2023, 2030, and 2040, respectively.  
It is unlikely that states could overcome such a reduction through increased efficiencies. 
States already aggressively pursue cost containment under the existing Medicaid program 
framework, including reducing provider payments, limiting the scope of benefits, eliminating 
optional services, contracting with managed care plans, instituting pharmaceutical management 
tools, and restricting eligibility in areas exempt from the Affordable Care Act’s maintenance of 
effort provisions (e.g., adults with incomes above 138% FPL in states certifying budget deficits) 
(Holahan and McMorrow 2012; Johnson, Oliff, and Williams 2011; Rosenbaum 2012; Williams, 
Leachman and Johnson 2011; Smith, et al. 2012). Thus, although average annual Medicaid 
expenditure growth is expected to reach 8.5% over the next decade, growth in per enroll 
spending is expected to continue at a modest 3.6%, with the remaining portion of projected 
growth in spending resulting from increases in enrollment (Holahan and McMorrow 2012). 
Unable to further reduce per enrollee costs states would be left with one of two options should 
program federal retrenchment occur, either funding their programs at existing levels but making 
up the difference through increased state spending, or, more likely, contracting their programs 
considerably. Moreover, no block grant proposal would permit states to opt out at any time due 
to overseen or untenable fiscal circumstances as is currently the case with the escape clause 
included in the waiver agreement between RI and the Federal government.  
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Looking forward the Urban Institute estimates that the House budget plan proposal would 
reduce federal Medicaid spending by 22% or $810 billion between 2013 and 2022 (Holahan, et 
al. October 2012). The impact of the House Republican Study Committee’s proposal would be 
even more dramatic, decreasing total Medicaid spending by $1.1 trillion, or 30%, between 2013 
and 2022, with federal Medicaid spending being 47% lower than it would be under current law 
by 2022 (Park and Broaddus 2012). Looking backward, the Center for Budget and Policy 
Priorities estimated that if the House budget plan had went into effect in 2001 total federal 
Medicaid spending would have been $555.0 billion or 31% less between 2001 and 2010, with a 
$80.7 billion or 37% reduction experienced in 2010 alone (Park and Broaddus 2012). Because 
annual growth in federal Medicaid allotments to states would only increase with population 
growth and inflation, it would grow at a much slower rate than otherwise expected. As a result, 
the gap between what the Federal government provides and what state’s need to fund their 
programs would widen with each passing year. This dynamic is reflected in both the prospective 
and retrospective analyses of the Ryan proposal described here. 
Doubts about the ability of block grants to account for changes in Medicaid program 
needs is also reflected in proposals made by the Reagan administration in 1981 and House 
Republicans in 1995. Both proposals included funding formulas later found to create a mismatch 
between proposed federal contributions and actual program costs. This is reflected in retroactive 
comparisons of Congressional Budget Office projections for spending under each proposal to 
actual program spending (Lambrew 2005). Under the Reagan administration’s proposal, 
projected federal Medicaid spending under the cap would have been 6% lower than actual 
spending over five years and 26% lower than actual spending over ten. Moreover, the difference 
between projected and actual funding levels would have risen considerably over time, with 
projected spending levels under the cap being 2%, 27%, and 53% lower than actual levels in 
1984, 1988, and 1991, respectively. Under the House Republican proposal, projected federal 
Medicaid spending under the cap would have been 3% higher than actual spending over five 
years and 2% lower than actual spending over seven. Again, the difference between actual and 
projected funding levels would have varied considerably over time, with the amount by which 
projected levels would have exceeded actual levels declining from 7% in 1997 to 2% in 1998, 
after which projected spending levels under the cap would have been lower than actual spending; 
for example, 3%, 8% and 16% in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively. Nationally, this reduction 
in spending would have resulted in 6 million people losing Medicaid coverage in 2022, if states 
addressed the entire shortfall by tightening program eligibility.  
Prior experience suggests just how difficult it is to create a suitable and fair formula to 
determine funding levels for a Medicaid block grant. Even if the goal was to establish funding 
formulas that adequately met future program needs, doing so is extremely challenging as 
economic, demographic, and medical inflation trends can be highly variable and unpredictable. 
Perhaps this is best reflected in comparison of actual federal Medicaid spending to projections 
made by the Congressional Budget Office (Lambrew 2005). Results indicate that the accuracy of 
three-year projections made from 1990 through 2002 ranged from 28% above actual spending in 
1996 to 31% below in 1992. Results also indicate that the accuracy of five-year projections made 
during this time period ranged from 44% above spending in 1998 to 37% below in 1992. 
Together these findings suggest that spending projections and funding formulas are very difficult 
to establish, likely resulting in funding shortfalls and service cuts over the long term. 
Block Grant Proposals Would Adversely Impact Provider Performance 
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Although states have a variety of different strategies with which to restrain Medicaid 
spending, freezes and reductions in provider reimbursement have often proven politically more 
palatable than cuts in benefits and eligibility, especially during hard economic times when people 
need Medicaid most (Miller 2002; Smith, et al. 2012). This suggests that marked reductions in 
federal spending associated with block granting Medicaid would have adverse implications not 
only for state budgets but also Medicaid providers. The Urban Institute estimated that the House 
budget plan would reduce hospital and nursing home payments by $363.8 and $220.2 billion, 
respectively, between 2013 and 2022 (Holahan, et al. October 2012). Such major reductions in 
payments could compromise the fiscal viability of already financially stressed safety net 
providers while reducing incentives for nursing homes, physicians, and other types of providers 
to participate in the Medicaid program, or to serve fewer Medicaid beneficiaries if they do 
participate, thereby compromising access and quality.  
Medicaid is the primary purchaser of nursing home in the United States, accounting for 
32.8% of total nursing home spending in 2009 (CMS 2011). It also serves as the primary source 
of payment for more than one-third of nursing home admissions (34.8%) and pays for all or part 
of the care received by more than half of current residents (59.7%) (Jones, et al. 2009). Evidence 
from the nursing home sector suggests just how important the level of payment and type of 
methodology chosen is, not just for access but also for quality of care (Feng, et al. 2008, 2010; 
Harrington, Swan, and Carrillo 2007; Intrator and Mor 2004; Mor, et al. 2011). Due largely to 
differentials in reimbursement, nursing home care in the U.S. has been “driven to tiers,” with the 
lowest quality facilities—those with the fewest nurses, most deficiencies, and lowest occupancy 
rates—being those serving predominately Medicaid residents (Mor, et al. 2004). The most poorly 
performing facilities are also more likely than their better performing counterparts to serve 
African Americans and Hispanics and to be located in poor counties and rural areas (Fennell, et 
al. 2010; Kang, Meng, and Miller 2011; Mor, et al. 2004; Smith, et al. 2007).  
Low levels of reimbursement is one reason why many doctors have either elected not to 
participate in Medicaid, or have limited the extent of their participation to a restricted number of 
clients, thereby leaving many beneficiaries to seek care from hospital emergency rooms, 
federally qualified health centers, or other safety-net providers (Cunningham and Nichols 2005; 
Cunningham and O’Malley 2009; Zuckerman, et al. 2004). Physicians practicing in states with 
higher Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios are significantly more likely to accept new Medicaid 
patients (Decker 2012). Recognizing challenges recruiting providers due to low payment levels, 
the Affordable Care Act increases payments to primary care physicians under Medicaid to 
Medicare levels. This change, however, will only last two years—2013 and 2014—and, as such, 
may have minimal impact on improving Medicaid beneficiary access to primary care over the 
long run. Given the history of low provider payment sin this area and the lingering effects of the 
fiscal crisis, it is highly unlikely that states will maintain Medicare-level reimbursement rates 
unless the Federal government picks up the tab, an even more remote possibility should the 
program be block granted. 
Because Medicaid is the single largest revenue source for safety-net providers, the impact 
of fiscal retrenchment, including block granting, on the limited revenue streams of public 
hospitals and providers that serve large numbers of low income patients is especially concerning. 
Medicaid constituted 33% of $40 billion in net revenues received by public hospitals in 2008 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2010). Although evidence is mixed about the quality of care provided 
to patients served in safety-net hospitals relative to other hospitals (Chatterjee, et al. 2012; 
McHugh, Kang, and Hasnain-Wynia 2009; Marshall, et al. 2012), there is little doubt that safety-
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net hospitals provide Medicaid and uninsured patients access to higher quality care than 
otherwise would be the case (Sabik and Bradley 2012; Hall, Hamacher, and Johnson 2012; Hall, 
Hwang, and Jones 2011). Provisions contained with the Affordable Care Act markedly reducing 
disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments, which provide additional Medicaid and 
Medicare reimbursement to providers that disproportionately serve low income individuals who 
are more likely to be uninsured or on Medicaid, could pose a particular challenges to the nation’s 
safety net system (Davis July 2012; Mitchell 2012). 
One reason providers did not actively oppose the Affordable Care Act was the 
expectation that Act’s Medicaid expansion together with increased access to subsidized private 
coverage would help compensate for lost revenues resulting from reductions in DSH and other 
public payment sources (Jost and Rosenbaum 2012; Moon 2012; Oberlander 2012). This 
suggests that those safety net providers located in states that choose not to expand Medicaid 
coverage or to aggressively pursue enrollment of potential eligibles if coverage is expanded, will 
have fewer resources to care for their patients than they had previously given the concomitant 
reduction in federal subsidies made available. Resulting fiscal pressures could, in turn, limit the 
provision of uncompensated care, increase bad debt, and result in closures of critical safety net 
institutions while adversely impacting access to and quality of care. Clearly, the adverse 
consequences of this dynamic would extend even more broadly should substantial reductions in 
federal Medicaid spending be enacted as per proposals to block grant the program and/or reduce 
the rate of expenditure growth to, say, the CPI +1%, as the resources available for paying 
providers would decline and fewer states would choose to participate in the Medicaid expansion 
while many of those that had chosen to participate would likely withdraw (Rosenbaum 2012). 
Block Grant Proposals Would Adversely Impact Beneficiary Well-Being 
Marked reductions in federal spending associated with a Medicaid block grant or other 
retrenchment would have especially adverse implications for beneficiaries. There are several 
reasons. As noted, subsequent reductions in provider payments would result in considerable state 
fiscal pressures that would, in turn, lead to reductions in the number of participating providers, 
thereby compromising access and quality. Moreover, restrictions on the number and scope of 
benefits would be put into place along with increases in beneficiary cost-sharing. The latter is 
particularly problematic. Extant research indicates that increasing cost-sharing through 
premiums, co-pays, and deductibles cause people to disenroll and/or reduce use of needed 
services, especially among the low-income populations Medicaid primarily serves (Wu and 
Wachino July 7, 2005; Artiga and O’Malley May 2005). It also indicates that cost sharing 
disproportionately disadvantages the chronically ill and those who have more frequent need of 
health care services.  
Even more fundamentally considerably more stringent restrictions on program eligibility 
would be adopted while investments in education and outreach aimed at enrolling otherwise 
eligible individuals would decline or cease. This, in turn, would impact a majority of Americans, 
51% of whom report some degree of personal connection to the program, either because they, a 
family member or friend has received some level of health and long-term care support (Kaiser 
Family Foundation May 2011). The Urban institute estimates that the House Budget Plan would 
result in 14.3 to 20.5 million fewer persons on the Medicaid rolls by 2022, a 25% to 35% 
reduction, with states needing to increase spending by $164.2 to $273.0 billion, or 46% to 77%, 
to avoid this decrease (Holahan, et al. October 2012). Most of those losing Medicaid coverage 
would become uninsured.  
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The number of uninsured Americans increased markedly from 43.4 to 49.2 million 
between 2007 and 2010 with the decline in employer-based coverage stemming from rising 
levels of unemployment and declining family incomes during the late recession and slow 
recovery (Kaiser Family Foundation September 2012). However, this figure would have been far 
higher without Medicaid, a quintessential countercyclical program that kicks into higher gear 
during hard economic times when the demand for government-subsidized assistance grows. It 
has been estimated that every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated 
with both a 1.1 million increase in uninsured and a 1.0 million increases in Medicaid enrollment 
(Dorn, et al. April 2008). Thus, from December 2007 to June 2010 the number of Medicaid 
enrollees increased by 7.6 million or 17.8% as the unemployment rate rose from 5.0 to 9.5% 
nationally (Kaiser Family Foundation February 2011). 
It was expected that the expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act to those 
with incomes up to 138% of the FPL would result in greater uniformity in Medicaid eligibility 
nationally, with an additional 21.3 million Americans obtaining health insurance coverage as a 
result of the expansion by 2022, 41% above expected baseline enrollment levels (Holahan, et al. 
November 2012). In a surprise move, however, the U.S. Supreme Court made the Medicaid 
expansion optional for states in its June 28, 2012 ruling on the constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act (Jost and Rosebaum 2012). In view of the decision, the impact of the expansion has 
been revised downward; it is now only expected to result in 11 million additional enrollees 
(Congressional Budget Office July 2012). To qualify for subsidies to purchase private health 
insurance coverage through the exchanges residents would need to have incomes between 133% 
and 400% of the FPL. That there is little overlap between the public and private coverage groups 
suggests that the vast majority of low income people living in states that either elect not to 
expand Medicaid coverage under the Affordable Care Act or to pull back on the expansion 
should the program be block granted or retrenched would be ineligible for subsidies through the 
exchanges and, as such, would remain uninsured (Oberlander 2012). In turn, those losing 
coverage would face considerable obstacles to obtaining needed care with adverse implications 
of health and well-being.  
Evidence from a randomized trial in Oregon provides strong evidence about impact of 
losing coverage (Baicker and Finkelstein 2011). Results indicate that those enrolled in Medicaid 
after being randomly selected to apply had a higher probability of prescription drug, outpatient 
care, and inpatient hospital use than those who remained unenrolled but on a waitlist for the 
program. Results also indicate that those enrolled in the program were more likely to have a 
usual source of care and to use preventive services. Increased use of health care services 
provided both health and financial benefits. Health-wise, Medicaid coverage increased the 
probability of reporting being happy and in better self-reported health while decreasing the 
likelihood of being screened for depression. Financially, Medicaid coverage reduced the 
likelihood of having to borrow money or to skip payments on other bills to pay for medical 
expenses, in addition to lowering the probability that unpaid bills would be referred to a 
collection agency. Although less methodologically rigorous, findings from this unique trial are 
broadly consistent with numerous other investigations that demonstrate access, health, and 
financial improvements associated with Medicaid and CHIP coverage, particularly when 
compared to being uninsured (Davis, et al. 2012; Institute of Medicine 2002; Kaiser Family 
Foundation October 2012; Ku and Ferguson 2011).  
Still other studies find survival benefits associated with coverage. This is reflected in a 
study that compared three states—New York, Maine, and Arizona—that expanded adult 
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Medicaid eligibility since 2000 to neighboring states that did not expand coverage. Results 
indicate that expansion was associated with a significant reduction in mortality—particularly 
among older adults, minorities, and residents of poor counties, increased rates of Medicaid 
coverage and decreased rates of uninsurance, lower rates of delayed care, and improvements in 
self-reported health, (Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein 2012). The mortality benefit, in particular, 
is consistent with the conclusions of an influential Institute of Medicine’s report that the 
uninsured not only receive too little care too late and receive poorer care when it is received, but 
are sicker and die earlier, including an estimated 18,314 deaths resulting from a lack of coverage 
in 2000 (Institute of Medicine 2002). Subsequent analyses by the Urban Institute place the 
number of deaths resulting from the lack of coverage between 2000 and 2006 in the 137,000 to 
165,000 range (Dorn 2008). 
Partisanship Drives State Responses to Medicaid Block Grant Proposals/Retrenchment 
How exactly would particular states respond if the Medicaid program was block granted? 
The answer will depend largely on a combination of political, economic, and programmatic 
considerations (Congressional Budget Office July 2012; Miller 2004, 2005). Block granting the 
program would increase state discretion over Medicaid program design and administration 
beyond the already considerable levels states possess. Traditionally, states of all types—rich and 
poor, conservative and liberal—have responded reliably to financial incentives promulgated 
under Medicaid (Kaiser Family Foundation August 2012). More than half implemented the 
program in 1966, the year in which federal funding first became available. All but Alaska (1972) 
and Arizona (1982) did so within four years. Thereafter, states responded to federal incentives to 
expand Medicaid to both newly mandatory and optional populations (e.g., pregnant women, 
infants, and children). Moreover, during FY 1998, the first year in which enhanced federal fiscal 
support became available under the Children’s Health Insurance Program, virtually all states (45) 
expanded coverage to low and moderate income children and families, with the remaining doing 
within the next two years.  
Federal matching grants such as Medicaid both increases the recipient government’s 
income, and lowers the price of the public good that is being provided (Miller 2004). Whereas 
states with a 50% FMAP, for example, pay for half of Medicaid program costs (e.g., New York, 
California), those with a 75% FMAP pay for just one-fourth (i.e., Mississippi). The result is that 
poor states have even greater incentives than financially well off states to increase spending 
beyond what otherwise would have been the case, a dynamic missing with block grants which 
have an income effect only and therefore tend to be much less simulative in their impact. This 
suggests that the gap in coverage between rich and poor states would surely widen if a block 
grant strategy to reforming the Medicaid program was pursued.  
Today’s hyper-partisan political environment further suggests that those states that might 
be most adversely impacted if the program were block granted or retrenched may, in fact, be 
most supportive if the federal government pursued this strategy. A May 2011 survey found that 
35% of Americans preferred to block grant Medicaid while 60% preferred to keep the Medicaid 
intact (Kaiser Family Foundation May 2011). The proportion preferring the block grant, 
however, increased from 18% among democrats to 36% among independents and 57% among 
republicans, a dynamic that has remained largely intact over time (Kaiser Family Foundation 
1996). This underlying opinion structure explains, in part, why conservative states dominated by 
republican officials have exhibited substantially stronger support for the block granting the 
program since such proposals began to hit their stride in conservative circles nearly 20 years ago 
(Lambrew 2005; Thompson and Burke 2007; Thompson 2012).  
17 
It is likely that partisanship will play a prominent role in informing state Medicaid 
decision making in the present political environment, even more so than fiscal or programmatic 
concerns. After all, it was Republican led states, including those with the highest proportion of 
uninsured residents, that brought the lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act, elected not to form their own state health insurance exchanges, and delayed accepting 
federal stimulus money, including $87 billion in additional Medicaid funding despite rising 
unemployment (Miller and Blanding 2012; Muscumeci July 2012; Oberlander 2012; 
Statehealthfacts.org. 2012). It is also Republican led states that have declined to participate in the 
Medicaid expansion. That the federal government will pay 100% of the costs during the first 
three years and at least 90% thereafter while eliminating almost all uncompensated care costs 
and providing health coverage to millions more Americans suggests just how good a deal the 
expansion is for state governments no matter what their particular circumstances (Rosenbaum 
and Westmoreland 2012; Angeles 2012). Indeed, the Urban Institute projects that if all states 
expanded the program state costs would be just 0.3% or $8 billion higher between 2013 and 
2022 relative to current law as compared to an increase of 21% or $800 billion for the federal 
government (Holahan, et al. November 2012). Moreover, states can expect a net decrease in 
costs of $10 billion as a result of an expected reduction of $18 billion in state and local 
uncompensated care costs. 
Ten states had already chosen not to participate in the Medicaid expansion as of January 
8, 2013, an additional five were leaning towards not doing so; each with a Republican governor 
(The Advisory Board Company 2013). This is in contrast to seventeen states and the District of 
Columbia that had already chosen to participate and another four that were leaning toward saying 
yes; all but four of which had a Democratic governor. Those Republican governors that have 
been quickest to decline participating led states that would have benefited more from the 
expansion than those who were quickest to declare their participation. This is reflected in the 
finding that, on average, states declining to expand would have experienced a 20.3% increase in 
total spending, primarily due to the provision of additional federal financial support, between 
2013 and 2022, as compared to a 13.8% estimated increase for states that have already agreed to 
do so (Holahan, et al. November 2012). It is also reflected in the finding that, on average, states 
declining to expand would have experienced an estimated incremental reduction of 24.5% in the 
number of uninsured residents during this time period as compared to an estimated reduction of 
17.4% for states that have already agreed to expand coverage under the program.  
Just as the Affordable Care Act passed Congress without a single Republican vote, House 
Budget Committee Chairmen Paul Ryan’s FY 2012 and FY 2013 budget proposals, which 
included provisions block granting Medicaid, passed the House of Representatives strictly along 
party lines before failing to make progress in the Democratically-controlled Senate. These 
proposals were strongly favored by the nation’s Republican governors and opposed by the 
nation’s Democratic governors (Republican Governors Public Policy Committee 2011; Stein 
2011). Whereas Democratic governors were open to negotiating beneficiaries’ entitlement to 
services but not states’ entitlement to federal fiscal support, Republican governors were open to 
negotiating radical departures in both areas. As with the Medicaid expansion, Republican-led 
states in favor of blocking granting the program would have been more adversely impacted than 
the Democratic-led states that opposed doing so. This is reflected in the finding that new state 
spending required to avoid enrollment cuts resulting from the House Republican block grant 
proposal varied across states with Republican and Democratic governorships, with the former 
being affected more, on average, than the latter. Thus, it was estimated that in 2022 Republican 
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led states would have to increase spending by 53.7% to 89.6%, on average, as compared to 
49.0% to 81.6% in states led by Democrats to prevent enrollment cuts that would result if the 
program was blocking granted (Holahan, et al. October 2012).  
Of course, neither block granting Medicaid is going to happen anytime soon in light of 
President Obama’s electoral triumph. Furthermore, the Budget Control Act of 2011, enacted 
August 2, 2011 to end the debt ceiling crisis, excludes Medicaid from automatic budget 
sequestration—that is, $1.2 trillion in across the board spending cuts from 2013 to 2012—if 
Congress and the President do not agree on deficit reduction equal to this amount. The Act, 
however, does not prevent Congress and the President from including Medicaid in a deal should 
negotiations to either prevent or ameliorate the effects of sequestration prove successful. At 8%, 
Medicaid is the third largest domestic program in the federal budget, behind Medicare (8%) and 
Social Security (20%) (Kaiser Family Foundation May 2012). Moreover, both Democrats and 
Republicans agree that, as a major contributor to the long term federal budget deficit, growth in 
federal health care spending needs to be restrained, though Republicans feel more strongly in this 
regard (Kaiser Family Foundation May 2011). Where they disagree is how best to achieve this 
objective with, according to Rosenbaum (2012), “Democrats emphasize transformation of the 
health care system through payment reform and organizational restructuring and Republicans 
[favor] tougher limits on federal spending that might galvanize deep downstream changes on the 
part of health care providers and consumers.” It likely, therefore, that block granting Medicaid 
reform will continue to be proposed by Republican officials, both in future budget proposals and 
presidential party platforms. 
Limitations 
We note several potential study limitations. First, we studied Medicaid reform in just one 
state. Consequently, our findings may not apply to other states which face substantially different 
circumstances. In general, however, we believe our findings are transferable. The general 
contours of other states’ policy communities within which long-term care policy is developed 
and implemented is similar to that which exists in RI (Miller and Banaszak-Holl 2005; Miller, et 
al. 2012). Second, there may have been bias inherent in the particular interview subjects selected. 
Because there was no sampling frame, and we relied on a combination of purposive and 
snowball sampling, potentially knowledgeable individuals may have been excluded. While we 
are confident that we spoke with most, if not all of the relevant stakeholders, our impressions 
may have been dependent, in part, on the specific individuals interviewed. Finally, the study was 
designed to acquire detailed information on the particular topic addressed, the design and 
implementation of Medicaid reform through RI’s Global Consumer Choice Compact Medicaid 
Waiver. Although providing a rich source of data, doing so sacrificed breadth for depth. Future 
research could build on the results reported by exploring additional retrenchment strategies. 
Conclusion 
Medicaid has remained remarkably durable over time, overcoming concerted efforts on 
the part of Republican presidents and Congressional majorities to block grant the program 
(Thompson 2012). Although it now serves as the backbone of the nation’s health reform efforts, 
continued vigilance will be necessary to promote expansion to the low income uninsured in 
recalcitrant states. It will also be necessary to ensure that sufficient resources are deployed to 
undertake the requisite education and outreach required to identify and to recruit potentially 
eligible participants. Should the current level of partisan disharmony continue over the long term 
program advocates will need to be especially vigilant should the Republican Party’s electoral 
success at the state level be matched federally. Rhode Island’s Global Waiver, which 
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conservative commentators and politicians have pointed to in support of radical reform, is not a 
true block grant, nor nearly as successful as they would claim. It is also substantially more 
generous than contemporary block grant proposals, both in the level of federal funding allocated 
and in the ability of the state to terminate participation virtually at any time. If the Medicaid 
program is to meet the needs of vulnerable Americans—low income children and families, the 
mentally ill, developmentally disabled, physically disabled, a growing population of elders in 
need of long term services and supports, its basic entitlement—both for states and 
beneficiaries—needs to remain intact. Program performance must continue to improve as well, 
perhaps informed by lessons drawn from the Global Waiver and other state reform efforts, both 
for state health reform generally and for strategies for reducing federal and state government 
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Table. Major Themes Arising During Three Major Phases with Illustrative Quotes 
 
Phase 1: Waiver Development 
 
 
1.a. The Global Waiver Was Politically and Ideologically Motivated 
 
“One of the things we really wanted…was…to test the financial model. You pick up a newspaper in this country once a week and you find out 
some state is talking about [how] it can’t sustain Medicaid. We actually wanted to say, ‘Well, try us. Rhode Island is a small state; we’ve got some 
good budget projections. Give us a bag of money; give us the rules you want us to run by, and let us see what we can do.’” (State Official) 
 
“This governor being the Republican that he is wanted to do something that was more along the lines of good Republican politics.” (Provider 
Representative) 
 
“There were conversations with CMS in the waning days of the Bush administration…There appeared to be a fair amount of interest…both on the 
part of the Bush administration, as well as the local administration in attaining a waiver that had a cap on expenditures. That turned out…to be a 
driving force in getting that approved.” (Provider Representative) 
 
1.b. Block Grant Structure of Proposed Waiver Heightened Stakeholder Concern 
 
“There was lots of concerns that the state was getting some blanket waiver of federal laws without them really having to be specific about what 
they would do. They were given flexibility to carve out different populations and offer them different benefit packages but we didn’t know who 
those populations were, or what the benefit packages were, that kind of thing.” (Consumer Advocate)  
 
“The idea was the state was saying to the feds, ‘you give us X amount of federal dollars over the course of five years, and which we could access 
at any time we want,’ and we will agree to a maintenance of effort amount, where we’ll put in a state amount [equal to] I think 23 percent of the 
budget…That really locked Rhode Island into a capped amount of money, which potentially they could have used more up front, leaving us with 
nothing towards the end of the five years.” (Consumer Advocate) 
 
Phase 2: Federal Approval  
 
 
2.a. Changes to the State’s Waiver Application: A Capped Federal Match 
 
“The rationale [for not allowing the block grant] was that it…would have taken [federal] legislation to roll back the law…And we [would] have 
fundamentally changed the nature of what’s an entitlement program…CMS said, ‘That’s not our issue to decide.’” (State Official) 
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“We went into that block grant discussion saying, ‘We save money, we want to keep this federal money. In other words, put it back in, and they’re 
saying, ‘What is this? You’re going to save money and keep the federal share? No, that’s our money.” (State Official) 
 
2.b. Stakeholder Concerns about the Capped Federal Match 
 
“The most important thing is the state still controls the spending. This is still a matched program. So in order…to get a federal dollar, the state has 
to spend a dollar first. So, really the Medicaid program is largely as it was before the Global Waiver was enacted. The question remains how much 
is the state willing to spend for Medicaid funded services [and] how can the state achieve savings…without harming beneficiaries or making 
unreasonable demands on providers.” (Consumer Advocate)* 
 
“There is not enough information…There’s not enough detail. They have not involved the community from the get-go. If they had, some of the 
questions we are asking, we might not have to.” (Consumer Advocate)* 
 
“The state was putting itself at risk because you just don’t know what circumstances are going to be over the course of the five years” (Consumer 
Advocate) 
 
“[Worried] they were going to woefully underestimate what we needed to fund this system.” (Provider Representative) 
 
2.c. Stakeholder Concerns about the Inclusion of an Escape Clause 
 
“One of the things that was a concern for people was that if we got into this and accepted it and went forward and then a year into it, or 18 months 
in it, or two years into it, people were like, ‘Man, this is not a great idea for us,’ if we walk away, we go back to bringing the Medicaid program 
under a state plan, which is not what anybody here would want. You don’t get to walk back to the RIte Care waiver.” (Provider Representative) 
 
2.d. Changes to the State’s Waiver Application: Special Terms & Three-Tier Oversight 
 
“The state can go forward and do, like, Category I changes pretty easily with CMS’ approval…Category II needs a little bit more of a public 
engagement process and is a little bit harder to do…And then [Category] III changes kind of like would really be hard to do.” (State Official) 
 
“[The goal of the three-tier system was] to ensure that the level of review by CMS was commensurate with the scope of that change. Prior to the 
Global Waiver any change regardless of how involved the change required the same amount of time and process from CMS.” (State Official)* 
 




“It’s kind of an interesting twist of fate that the Governor’s Office has pursued this waiver thinking that the federal government would give them 
all sorts of carte blanche to do things, where now I think the administration will be looking very closely at what the state is saying it wants to do.” 
(Consumer Advocate) 
 
2.e. Changes to the State’s Waiver Application: Cost Not Otherwise Matchable (CNOM) 
 
“One of the things that the central office said to us is that of the state’s that came in asking for CNOMs, we were the only ones who had come in 
with a very thought out, legitimate argument that could show that if we CNOM’d this program, and preserved it, and expanded it, it would 
ultimately, over time, reduce utilization in that case, or utilization of more higher cost services.” (State Official) 
 
Phase 3: Program Implementation  
 
 
3.a. Federal Stimulus and Health Reform Legislation Facilitated Implementation 
 
“Well, the main thing that the ARRA funding has done is to protect the state from rolling back eligibility for parents, and implementing the 
premiums in the RIte Care program, because I’m 100 percent certain that if the ARRA hadn’t been in effect the state this year would have [done 
so] since they’ve done it in less severe fiscal times” (Consumer Advocate) 
 
“All I can say is thank goodness for the federal stimulus package because if we didn’t have these federal requirements, what’s called the MOE, the 
Maintenance of Effort requirements, I think RIte Care would be sliced and diced in a million ways to Sunday by now, and luckily health care 
reform also put in MOEs beyond what the stimulus MOEs are.” (Consumer Advocate) 
 
“In general, the enhanced FMAP delayed or prevented the need to make some really, really tough decisions. It allowed us to go forward and do 
some things with implementation, because there was an influx of money coming in where we may have [otherwise have] been in a position where 
we were reacting to the deficit. A lot of best made plans get tumbled when we get, ‘come up with $90 million,’ you know?” (State Official) 
 
“I don’t think the waiver would have worked without the federal Medicaid enhancement and stimulus…because in order to do the rebalancing that 
needed to happen, that’s like 18 months to two years worth of just internal work about redesigning programs, retraining-recruiting staff.” (State 
Official) 
 
3.b. Cap on Federal Expenditures Has Not Been an Issue 
 
“You have to remember under the cap our Medicaid expenditures are driven by state spending and we just knew the state didn’t have the 
money…The way general revenue was moving, even if things had improved substantially, we knew we weren’t going to hit the cap, and we knew 
we had a fiscal and an administrative cushion because of the incoming CNOM.” (State Official) 
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“Rhode Island is well within its budget protection. We built in a caseload growth factor in the vicinity of 6.5%...We thought we’d be within 4 
points on a real basis, but we wanted to put on some cushioning there, because of the unemployment…[So we] thought we had enough money and 
it’s shown itself out now…The number [in the revised waiver application was $12.9 billion] over a five year period—we’re trending right now to 
spend $10 billion…We didn’t want to sign a deal if we thought we were going to lose money.” (State Official) 
 
“The cap is really not a cap…the cap is like star wars…I mean they couldn’t spend $12 billion if they tried in five years” (Provider Representative) 
 
“In hindsight, some of the good news is it looks like the cap that the state was able to negotiate with CMS will be sufficiently high.” (Provider 
Representative) 
 
“The federal cap is so high that it’s almost a red herring. It provided an opportunity for everybody to stand up and say there’s a cap on the federal 
dollars, but the likelihood of getting there was slim and none. There are not enough state dollars to ever reach that cap.” (Provider Representative) 
 
3.c. CNOM Dollars Helped Ameliorate Impact of Fiscal Crisis and Federal Spending Cap 
 
“The greatest thing that came out of it for the state was the CNOM areas where they were able to grab Medicaid dollars that they hadn’t been able 
to get before.” (Provider Representative) 
 
“A good part of the waiver in these economic times is that those state funded programs might have been cut were it not for the ability to get the 
federal matching dollars…[A program] that had been proposed to be cut, for example, last year [because it was state funded], now it wasn’t on the 
chopping block….because…now its federal and state funded.” (Consumer Advocate) 
 
“The Global Waiver allowed us…[to fund] the [co-pay] program at a slightly higher level [and accrue] savings [in] general revenue funds, because 




*Quote derives from legislative hearing 
 
